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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to model trading decisions of financial investors based on a sentiment
index. For this purpose, we analyse a dynamical model which includes the sentiment index in the
agents’ trading behavior. We consider the set up of a Discrete Dynamical System, assuming that in
financial markets transactions take place between two groups of fundamentalists that differ in their
perception of fundamental value. The proportion of fundamentalists in the two groups is assumed
to depend on the sentiment index. The sentiment index used is related to the risk asymmetry index
(RAX) enabling us to consider both the variance and the asymmetry of the prediction error between
the two groups of fundamentalists. We identify the equilibria of the model and conduct a numerical
analysis in order to capture stylized facts documented empirically in the financial literature.
Keywords: Sentiment index; Market risk; Asymmetry; Bifurcation analysis; Numerical simulations
1 Introduction
In the financial literature, it is assumed that investors are loss-adverse in the sense that they are happier
with a gain than a loss of the same amount. Furthermore, investors are more sensitive to losses than to
gains. Moreover, the distribution of stock returns in financial markets is found to be negatively skewed,
in other words, extreme and negative events are more probable than positive ones, in contrast with the
assumption of a normal distribution that assigns the same probability to positive and negative returns.
If we combine assumptions about investor preferences and empirical evidence on financial returns, we
uncover the need for an indicator accounting for these stylized facts. Based on this line of reasoning,
some studies have analyzed the role of investor sentiment in stock price formation suggesting that investor
sentiment is one of the main determinants of asymmetry in stock returns (Jawadi et al. (2018), Verma
and Soydemir (2009)).
On the other hand, many theoretical and empirical studies have analysed asset price dynamics in financial
markets in order to explain stylized facts of stock returns, such as asymmetry, excess of kurtosis and
volatility clustering. An important role in this sense is played by models with heterogeneous agents (see
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Chiarella et al. (2002, 2009), Gaunersdorfer (2000) among others). Models with heterogeneous agents
exhibit a good performance in capturing market behavior and in the replication of econometric properties
and stylized facts of financial time series (see for example He and Li (2007), Franke and Westerhoff
(2016)). Moreover, it is well known that models involving heterogeneous agents allow for considerable
flexibility in investor behavior because they have the opportunity to switch between different trading
rules according to certain fitness measures (Brock and Hommes (1998)). The majority of models with
heterogeneous agents consider two types of traders: fundamentalists and chartists. Fundamentalists are
aware of market fundamentals and they believe in reversion to the mean, while chartists are considered
as a source of instability in the model because with their speculative behavior they destabilize the market
leading to intricate scenarios. As a result, these studies consider heterogeneity both in the expectations
of agents and their trading decision rules.
The aim of our paper is to highlight the role of a sentiment index in the market with heterogeneous
agents. As a proxy for the sentiment index, we adopt the Risk Asymmetry Index (RAX) introduced by
Elyasiani et al. (2018). The RAX index aims to capture the risk asymmetry in the market, i.e. the higher
volatility negative returns, compared to the volatility of positive returns. We examine the joint role of
heterogeneity and non-linearity (introduced by the sentiment index) in financial markets. We model an
endogenous switching mechanism between traders relying on the sentiment index, that is considered as a
benchmark index for all agents. We consider two groups of fundamentalists that adopt the same trading
rule but heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental value. In this way, we implicitly introduce a degree of
uncertainty about the true fundamental value (which in He and Zheng (2016) is modelled directly in the
utility function).
There are a few studies that consider only fundamentalists in asset pricing models. In particular,
Naimzada and Ricchiuti (2008) analyze a financial market with two fundamentalists acting as gurus.
Traders followed one of the two fundamentalists, by relying on a fitness measure that involves the dis-
tance between the fundamental value and the current price. They found that complex dynamics arise
when market maker and agents overreact to price misalignment. However, this model does not consider
market sentiment: fundamentalists take trading decisions by looking at the distance between the fun-
damental price and the current price. On the other hand, we assume that all the agents in the market
take trading decisions by looking at the same sentiment index. Second, unlike Naimzada and Ricchiuti
(2008), we do not consider any kind of imitation, in the sense that in the market there are only two types
of agent and no other trader is allowed to enter in the market. The introduction of a sentiment index is
the innovative aspect of our model, and it is the main reason that leads us to consider only one group of
traders. In this way we can analyse the effect of the sentiment index on the complex scenarios without the
destabilization in the market introduced by chartists. Another study considering only fundamentalists
is that of Kaltwasser (2010). The author analyzes a heterogeneous agent model of the FOREX market,
building on the model of Alfarano et al. (2008) considering only fundamentalists. Unlike our study, the
author considers the FOREX market and relies on a probabilistic approach, focusing mainly on numerical
results. On the other hand, we adopt a qualitative analysis, both analytically and numerically. Moreover,
we extend our model by including stochastic shocks to the demand of both fundamentalists. In this way
we show that our model is capable to matching the stylized facts observed in financial markets.
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Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, for the first time we introduce a new sentiment index
relying on the work of Elyasiani et al. (2018), that takes into consideration the difference between the
market price and the two fundamental prices, representing market sentiment. Thanks to the sentiment
index, traders modify their expectations about fundamental value and consequently they switch to the
strategy that they believe to be performing better. Second, by using the sentiment index, we model
theoretically the empirical evidence on the fact that periods of declining prices (fear scenario) have a
greater impact on volatility than periods rising prices (greed scenario).
Our analysis confirms the findings of Elyasiani et al. (2018), that is, the RAX index has the advantage of
signaling prevailing market sentiment. In particular it is a sentiment index of fear in the sense that it is
able to signal downturn moves to investors that can modify their strategies in order to avoid huge losses.
Moreover, we find that a period of stability in the market is possible only when the fraction of one type
of trader is very low.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section (2) we describe the model setup. Section (3) focuses on the
study of fixed points and their stability analysis. Section (4) analyses the economic implications of our
model with a bifurcation analysis and a global analysis. In Section (5) we extend the deterministic model
introducing stochastic shock to the fundamental demand of both types of traders and we carry out an
in-depth statistical analysis comparing our results with those of the S&P500 index. Section (6) concludes
our work.
2 The model
We outline a financial market model which describes price dynamics in the presence of traders with dif-
ferent beliefs about fundamental value. The model includes a market maker who adjusts the price based
on order imbalances, two fundamentalists who believe in reversion to the mean (i.e. they expect the price
to return to the fundamental value F ). As a result, fundamentalists place orders to buy when the price is
below F because in this case they believe that the market is undervalued; they place orders to sell when
the price is above F because they believe that the market is overvalued.
Our model incorporates two types of fundamentalists: in particular, we assume that type-2 fundamental-
ists (f2) underestimate the fundamental value with respect to type-1 fundamentalists (f1), i.e. F2 < F1.
This implies that when the price (Pt) is lower than F2, type-2 fundamentalists overestimate the price
less than type-1 fundamentalists. On the other hand, when price Pt is higher than F1, type-2 funda-
mentalists underestimate the price Pt more than type-1 fundamentalists. We assume that both types of
fundamentalist have the same excess demand function:
Df1t = λ(F1 − Pt) (1)
Df2t = λ(F2 − Pt) (2)
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Figure 1: Fear and Greed predominance regions
where Dfit is the excess demand function for type-i fundamentalists; i = 1, 2, λ is a positive parameter
and indicates how aggressively the fundamentalist reacts to the distance of the price to the corresponding
fundamental value (F1, F2).
Within this framework, when the price is below F2 type-2 fundamentalists buy less than type-1 funda-
mentalists. When price is above F1, type-2 fundamentalists sell more than type-1 fundamentalists.
Depending on the price, we can distinguish the following fear or greed predominance regions (see Fig. 1):
a) when Pt > F1 > F2, in this case both fundamentalists sell, type-2 fundamentalists sell more than
type-1 (fear predominance region).
b) F2 < Pt < F1, type-2 fundamentalists sell, whereas type-1 fundamentalists buy. This is similar to
the bull and bear regime described in Day and Huang (1990) or Tramontana et al. (2009) (fear and
greed mixed predominance region).
c) Pt < F2 < F1, both types of fundamentalists buy, but type-2 fundamentalists buy less than type-1
fundamentalists (greed predominance region).
The stock market is characterized by the presence of a market maker that sets the stock price Pt+1
according to total excess demand:
Pt+1 = Pt +
(
w1D
f1
t + w2D
f2
t
)
(3)
where wi is the proportion of fundamentalists of type i, i = 1, 2 and w1 + w2 = 1.
We consider a fixed number of traders equal to 2N , ni is the number of fundamentalists of type i = 1, 2:
n1 + n2 = 2N (4)
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Therefore
w1 =
n1
2N
and w2 =
n2
2N
(5)
We assume that the number of type-1 and type-2 fundamentalists varies according to the following market
sentiment index:
ηt =
(F1 − Pt)2 − (F2 − Pt)2
(F1 − Pt)2 + (F2 − Pt)2 (6)
The sentiment index measures in relative terms the distance between the price Pt and the two fundamental
prices, F1 and F2. In particular the numerator measures how close the price is to the fundamental value
F1 and subtracts how close the price is to the fundamental value F2. This difference is normalized by the
sum of the two distances (the denominator). In this way the sentiment index is bounded between [−1, 1]
(see Fig.(1)). In particular, if the price is close to the fundamental value F1 then the index is negative
since for prices higher than F1 both types of investors sell and for prices Pt >
F1+F2
2 and lower than F1
type-1 investors buy with a lower intensity than that which characterizes the selling behaviour of type-2
investors, yielding an overall sell signal. In fact, when Pt >
F1+F2
2 then the sentiment index is negative.
When Pt = F1 then the sentiment index reaches its minimum value equal to −1. The sentiment index
is such that if the price is higher than F1 it gradually returns to zero, since the selling behavior of both
types of fundamentalists determines an oversold market. On the other hand, if the price is close to the
fundamental value F2 then the index is positive since for prices lower than F2 both types of investors
buy and for prices Pt <
F1+F2
2 and higher than F2 type-1 investors buy with a higher intensity than that
which characterizes the selling behaviour of type-2 investors, yielding an overall buy signal. In fact, when
Pt <
F1+F2
2 then the sentiment index is positive. When Pt = F2 then the sentiment index reaches its
maximum value equal to 1. The sentiment index is such that if the price is lower than F2 it gradually
returns to zero, since the buying behavior of both types of fundamentalists determines an overbought
market. Last, if Pt =
F1+F2
2 the sentiment index is equal to zero, indicating no buy or sell signal.
The number of type-1 and type-2 fundamentalists varies according to the sentiment index in the following
way1.
n1 = n2 − 2Nη (7)
As a result, the number of type-1 fundamentalists is equal to the number of type-2 fundamentalists when
η = 0. The number of type-1 fundamentalists is greater than the number of type-2 fundamentalists when
η < 0. The number of type-1 fundamentalists is smaller than the number of type-2 fundamentalists when
η > 0. The closer the price to the fundamental value F1 the more the proportion of type-1 fundamentalists
1see Lux (1995)
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increases since they performed better than the other group in forecasting the equilibrium price (and in the
market we have an overall fear predominance since investors expect the price to decrease). On the other
hand, tthe closer the price to the fundamental value F2 the more the proportion of type-2 fundamentalists
increases since they performed better than the other group in forecasting the equilibrium price (and in
the market we have an overall greed predominance since investors expect prices to increase).
The final map: Based on the above considerations, we obtain the first order nonlinear discrete dynamical
equation which describes the price evolution over time. It takes the following form:
Pt+1 = Pt +
{[ n2
2N
− (F1 − Pt)
2 − (F2 − Pt)2
(F1 − Pt)2 + (F2 − Pt)2
]
λ(F1 − Pt) +
[ n1
2N
+
(F1 − Pt)2 − (F2 − Pt)2
(F1 − Pt)2 + (F2 − Pt)2
]
λ(F2 − Pt)
}
(8)
3 Stability analysis of equilibrium points
In this section we explore the qualitative properties of Map (8). We first consider, for the sake of
completeness, the case of homogeneous fundamentalists, then the more interesting case of heterogeneous
fundamentalists.
Homogeneous fundamentalists. If both fundamentalists are of the same type, they have equal beliefs
in the fundamental price, that is F1 = F2, then the final Map (8) becomes:
Pt+1 = Pt +
(
1− n1
2N
)
λ(F − Pt) + ( n1
2N
)λ(F − Pt)
and the fixed point is the fundamental price P ∗ = F . In this case it turns out that:
dPt+1
dPt
= 1− λ
and we have a situation in which the market reaches a stable equilibrium if 0 < λ < 2.
Heterogeneous fundamentalists. We first show the existence of the fixed points analytically and
then we study their local stability by means of graphical analysis. The condition for the existence of the
steady state of the Map (8) is Pt+1 = Pt = P
∗. Therefore, we solve the following equation in the variable
P ∗:
T (P ∗) =
[ n2
2N
− (F1 − P
∗)2 − (F2 − P ∗)2
(F1 − P ∗)2 + (F2 − P ∗)2
]
λ(F1 − P ∗) +
[(
1− n2
2N
)
+
(F1 − P ∗)2 − (F2 − P ∗)2
(F1 − P ∗)2 + (F2 − P ∗)2
]
λ(F2 − P ∗) = 0 (9)
The following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 Assume Pt > 0 ∀t and F1 > F2. Then Map (8) admits three real fixed points P ∗i with
i = 1, 2, 3 given by:
P ∗1 = F2 P
∗
2 = F1 P
∗
3 ∈ (F2, F1) (10)
The fixed points belong to the interval [F2, F1].
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Proof 1 In order to compute the fixed points we have to solve Eq.(9). It may be seen that the two
fundamental prices F1 and F2 are two of the fixed points of the model. Indeed, if we substitute P
∗ = F1
we have:
− n2
2N
λ(F2 − F1) = 0
Note that, assuming P ∗ = F1 we have a situation in which type-1 fundamentalists have performed better
than type-2 fundamentalists and in this case all fundamentalists become type 1, which implies
n2
2N
= 0.
Therefore F1 solves Eq.(9) and it is a solution. A similar argument holds with regards to the second fixed
point, F2. Assuming P
∗ = F2 we have that type-2 fundamentalists have performed better than type-1
fundamentalists and in this case all fundamentalists become type 2, which implies
n1
2N
= 0. Therefore F2
solves Eq.(9) and it is a solution. For the existence of the third fixed point in the interval (F2, F1) we
make use of the intermediate value theorem. In particular, consider the midpoint of the segment ¯F2F1,
i.e.
F1 + F2
2
. Now, we take the midpoints of the two intervals (F2,
F1+F2
2 ) and (
F1+F2
2 , F1), namely points
I1 and I2 and evaluate Eq.(9) in each of the points. Given that T (P (I1)) < 0 and T (P (I2)) > 0 and that
the function T (P ) is continuous in the interval (F2, F1), it may be said that in this interval there is a
solution for Eq.(9) and it is unique. This concludes the proof.
Note that in the steady state P ∗2 = F1 (P
∗
1 = F2), the share of type-2 fundamentalists (1) is zero.
The presence of both types of fundamentalists is possible only in the third steady state P ∗3 . Thanks to
graphical analysis it will be demonstrated that the steady state P ∗3 is always unstable since it delimits
the basins of attraction of the other two steady states. For appropriate values of parameters, we find
that it does not coincide with (F1+F22 ).
The possible scenarios arising in our model are described in the following Proposition (2)
Proposition 2 Assume F1 6= F2. Let cmin, cmax be the local minimum and the local maximum of
the Map (8); Cmin and Cmax are their iterates respectively, that is Cmin = Pt+1(cmin) and Cmax =
Pt+1(cmax), then there exist two disjoint invariant
2 intervals I = [Pt+1(cmin), Pt+1(Cmin)] and J =
[Pt+1(cmax), Pt+1(Cmax)] such that:
1. Fear or Greed scenario: if Pt+1(Cmin) < P
∗
3 and Pt+1(Cmax) > P
∗
3 , then Map (8) has two
coexistent attractors, P ∗1 and P
∗
2 ;
2. Fear and Greed scenario: for Pt+1(Cmin) = Pt+1(Cmax) = P
∗
3 the two attractors merge and a
contact bifurcation occurs.
In scenario (1) depicted in Figure (2), we observe the trajectory of the price converging to one of the
two coexisting attractors, P ∗1 or P
∗
2 , depending on the initial condition P0. Indeed, if we take an initial
condition P0 close to P
∗
1 , then the price converges to P
∗
1 (Figures (2a-b) greed scenario). On the other
hand, taking an initial condition P0 close to P
∗
2 , then the price converges to P
∗
2 (Figures (2c-d) fear
scenario). It may be noted that the attractor may be a fixed point, an n-period cycle, a strange attractor
or the union of two coexisting attractors. Therefore in scenario (1) we have a greed or a fear scenario
depending on the initial condition.
2A set I ⊆ R+ is positively (negatively) invariant if T i(I) ⊆ I (T i(I) ⊇ I) ∀i ∈ Z+. Moreover, I is invariant when it is
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Figure 2: Coexistence of attractors for parameters n2 = 0.5, F1 = 3.44, F2 = 1.36, λ = 1.3, N = 0.5
In (a) and (b)(greed scenario) an i.c. P0 = 1.5 generates a trajectory converging to the fixed point P
∗
1 .
While in (c) and (d) (fear scenario), for P0 = 3 the trajectory converges to the fixed point P
∗
2 .
In scenario (2) shown in Figure (3) we have the occurrence of a homoclinic bifurcation. In particular, in
Fig. (3a-b) the two absorbing intervals are merged. In this case the two chaotic attractors are transformed
into a one-piece chaotic attractor. Fig.(3c-d) shows a more chaotic dynamic, with respect to the former,
due to the merging of the two attractors which now form a q-piece chaotic attractor where complex price
dynamics arise. Therefore in this scenario we have a recursive flip of the price between fear and greed
regions.
Another important feature of our model is that the fixed point P ∗3 could be asymmetrically distributed
in the interval (F2, F1). In Fig.(4) we find two trajectories leading to the two coexisting attractors. This
case arises for a different value of the parameter n2 (the fraction of fundamentalists of type 2). Indeed,
when we decrease the value of n2, the basin of attraction of the fixed point F2 enlarges with respect to
that of the other fixed point F1.
Finally, in Fig.(5), we investigate the role of the reactivity parameter λ in determining the structure of
the basins of attraction. In particular, in Figure (5a) and Figure (5b) we have two disconnected basins
of attraction, i.e. the basins of the two fixed points are located also in regions that do not contain
the relative fixed points3. The greater the value of λ, the more complex the structure of the basins of
attraction.
In Section (4) we describe in detail the scenarios analysed in the graphical analysis from an economic
perspective in order to match our findings with the stylized facts.
both positively and negatively invariant. Finally, a closed and positively invariant region is called trapping.
3see Abraham et al. (1997)
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Figure 3: Homoclinic bifurcations scenario. In (a) and (b), two complex attractors merge for n2 = 0.5,
F1 = 3.44, F2 = 1.36, λ = 1.79, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.5. In (c) and (d) there is the occurrence of an
homoclinic bifurcation for n2 = 0.5, F1 = 3.44, F2 = 1.36, λ = 2.2, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.5.
Figure 4: Asymmetric mid fixed point. In (a) and (b) the trajectory converges to the fear attractor for
n2 = 0.7, F1 = 2.04, F2 = 0.65, λ = 1.8, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 2. In (c) and (d), the trajectory leads to
the greed attractor for n2 = 0.4, F1 = 2.2, F2 = 0.81, λ = 1.8, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.2.
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Figure 5: The role of parameter λ. Two pictures showing the basins of attraction of Map(8). In (a),
n2 = 0.7, F1 = 1.8, F2 = 1, λ = 1.58, N = 0.5. In (b) we use the set of parameters n2 = 0.7, F1 = 1.8,
F2 = 1, λ = 1.64, N = 0.5.
4 Numerical analysis
In this section we shed light on the main insights of our work. From the stability analysis we know
that the three equilibria always exist. From an economic point of view, instead, our model is able to
capture interesting features of financial markets. In particular, our goal is the introduction of the RAX
sentiment index introduced by Elyasiani et al. (2018) observing how it works as a reference index of market
sentiment. Instead of introducing heterogeneity into the behavioural rules of each group of agents, we
highlight how agents with the same trading behavior (fundamentalists) influence market sentiment. In
this sense, the RAX index is a sentiment index because it records the prevalent trend of the market
(which we have referred to as fear and greed predominance). Another important element of our analysis
is the role of the fundamental values perceived by the two groups of traders. In particular, the difference
in the two fundamental prices matters not only in a mixed fear and greed scenario Fig.(6) but also in a
fear or greed scenario Fig.(7) thanks to the signal contained in the sentiment index. Indeed, in Fig.(6a)
it is apparent how the interaction of both types of fundamentalist leads to complicated dynamics and a
period of volatility of the price. On the other hand, if we look to Fig.(6b) for the same level of reaction
of traders, we see an amplification of price volatility when the distance between the two fundamental
prices increases. Moreover, in both cases, when the fraction of fundamentalists of type i, with i = 1, 2,
is sufficiently lower than the proportion of fundamentalists of type j, with j = 1, 2 and j 6= i, then the
market reaches a stable equilibrium. Considering Fig.(6a), for n2 ≈ 0.1 the stable two cycle scenario
disappears and a cascade of flip bifurcation becomes apparent. We note that two different attractors
coexist, implying that the asymptotic dynamic of price can lead to one of the two attractors depending
on the initial condition. At n2 ≈ 0.2 the two attractors merge into a single attractor generating a
homoclinic bifurcation. In line with He and Zheng (2016), we can attribute the difference between the
two fundamental prices to the uncertainty about the true value of the fundamental. Traders try to guess
the fundamental price taking into account private information in addition to the public information given
by the sentiment index. This gives rise to endogenous heterogeneity and switching behavior on the part
of agents.
Based on our analysis, a period of stability is possible when the proportion of one type of trader is
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Figure 6: The role of the difference between F1 and F2. Two pictures showing the bifurcation diagram
with respect to n2 in the fear and greed scenario. In (a) parameters F1 = 2.5, F2 = 2, λ = 2, N = 0.5
and i.c. P0 = 1.5. In (b) parameters F1 = 12, F2 = 10, λ = 2, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.5.
very low (e.g. n2, see Fig.(8)), implying that when the market is mainly populated by one type of
fundamentalist, the level of uncertainty diminishes significantly. However, also in a period of stability,
the difference between the two fundamental prices determines a higher price volatility in a fear scenario
(Fig.(7b)) compared to a greed scenario (Fig.(7a)).
Our framework is also able to capture the asymmetry in the return distribution of prices. In this con-
nection, the introduction of the RAX index has the property of signaling the sentiment prevailing in the
market, in order to allow traders to take their final decision on whether to buy or sell. It is self-evident
that investors prefer positive returns to negative ones, and the literature provides evidence that the re-
turn distribution is negatively asymmetric which implies in turn many low positive returns and a small
number of large losses. This is captured in our model, since the volatility of prices when the market faces
a fear scenario is higher than the volatility occurring in the greed scenario or in the mixed fear and greed
scenario. In Fig.(8) we show the three possible scenarios of our model. It is evident that, in the fear
scenario, the volatility of the price is much larger than in the other two cases. These findings confirm
that the RAX index is a sentiment index of fear in the sense that it is able to signal downturn periods to
investors who can modify their strategies in order to avoid huge losses.
Finally, we wish to stress the role of the reactivity parameter λ and heterogeneity (F2−F1) in determining
chaotic dynamics. This situation is described in Fig.(9) where we note the transition to more complicated
dynamics when both λ and F1 increase. Fig.(9a) shows the origin of a two-piece chaotic attractor while
in Fig.(9b) we see that the two attractors give rise to a homoclinic bifurcation.
5 Stochastic model
In this section we explore the statistical properties generated by our model, showing that it is able to
match a rich set of empirically observed stylized facts. The main empirical evidence that we will deal with
in this section will concern heavy tails, absence of autocorrelations, volatility clustering, long memory and
power law behavior characterizing the distribution of large returns (see Lux and Alfarano (2016); Lux and
Marchesi (2000), He and Li (2007); He and Zheng (2016), Cont (2001) for example). In particular, we add
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Figure 7: The role of the difference between F1 and F2. A stable two-cycle in (a) greed scenario for
n2 = 0.5, F1 = 2, F2 = 1.9, λ = 2, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.5; and (b) fear scenario for n2 = 0.5, F1 = 2,
F2 = 1.36, λ = 2, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.5.
Figure 8: The three scenarios. Greed scenario (yellow diagram) with parameters F1 = 2, F2 = 1.9,
λ = 1.72, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.8. Fear and greed scenario (blue diagram) with parameters F1 = 2,
F2 = 1.75, λ = 2, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.8. Fear scenario (red diagram) with parameters F1 = 2,
F2 = 1.36, λ = 1.72, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.8.
Table 1: Summary statistics of returns. The table reports the summary statistics including mean,
standard deviation (sd), skewness, kurtosis, minimum and maximum value, Jarque-Bera test and statistic
of S&P500, SM .
Mean sd Min Max Skewness Kurtosis J-B J-B statistic
S&P500 0.0000 0.0093 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.4976 7.5827 1 2324.90
SM 0.0000 0.1175 -0.0006 0.0005 -0.1493 4.9563 1 1240.10
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Figure 9: Bifurcation diagrams with respect to F1 showing the transition from a 2-piece chaotic attractor
to a 1-piece chaotic attractor for given values of parameters. In (a) n2 = 0.5, F2 = 1.5, λ = 1.65, N = 0.5
and i.c. P0 = 1.5, in (b) n2 = 0.5, F2 = 1.5, λ = 1.7, N = 0.5 and i.c. P0 = 1.5.
Figure 10: Returns series (panel (a)), Q-Q plot (panel (b)) and the histogram (panel (c))for S&P500 index
for time periods t ∈ [2010, 2020]. The same diagrams for SM are figured in panels (c)-(e) respectively.
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noise to both the fundamental demand processes and examine the dynamics of the model using numerical
simulations. Combining the deterministic and stochastic elements, the demand of type-1 fundamentalists
is
Df1t = λ(F1 − Pt) + f1t f1t ∼ N(0, (σf1)2) (11)
and, similarly, the demand of type-2 fundamentalists is given by
Df2t = λ(F2 − Pt) + f2t f2t ∼ N(0, (σf2)2) (12)
where σf1 and σf2 are two positive parameter representing the standard deviations of the normal random
variables. Without loss of generality, we assume that σf1 = σf2 . In our analysis we consider the price
returns, defined as
rt = ln(Pt)− ln(Pt−1) (13)
focusing on the deviation from normality of their distribution. As a benchmark we consider the daily
log-returns of the S&P500 from January 02, 2010 to January 28, 2020. To differentiate the time series
generated from the S&P500 index (S&P500) and the simulated stochastic model (SM) we add S&P500
and SM in front of the name of each time series. In all the simulations performed we consider the fol-
lowing parameter set: N = 0.5; n2 = 0.5; F1 = 2000; F2 = 1200; λ = 0.1, P0 = 1500, σ
f1 = σf2 = 0.09.
In Table(1) we provide some useful summary statistics for the returns of the S&P500 and the SM and
the diagrams shown in Fig. 10 will help us to interpret these statistics.
Fig.10 (a) and (d) show that the time series exhibit volatility clustering, which is characterized by inter-
mittent and large fluctuations. Actually, the heterogeneity regarding the beliefs about the fundamental
price is responsible for producing such patterns. In Fig.10 (c) and (f) we compare the shape of the
distribution with a normal distribution with variance identical to the sample variance (depicted by the
solid line). We note a stronger concentration around the mean, with a greater probability mass in the
tails of the distribution and thinner shoulders. All these aspects are a typical deviation from the normal
distribution and are to be found in the empirical literature (see Lux (1998); Lux and Marchesi (2000)).
In Fig.10 (b) and (e) we report the Q-Q plot of the returns for S&P500 and SM . They display the
quantile of the sample data (returns) versus the theoretical quantiles of the normal distribution. If the
distribution of returns is normal, then the plot appears to be linear, which is not the case in this instance.
Indeed, the tails lay below and above the 45 degree line implying that their distributions are fat-tailed,
as well (see Fig.10 (b) and (e)). We also analyze the non-normality of the returns conducting the Jarque-
Bera test (see Table1). In particular, we test the null hypothesis that returns follow a normal distribution
at the 1% significant level. The returned value of J − B = 1 indicates that the Jarque-Bera test rejects
the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level, additionally, the test statistic, J −B statistic, is greater
than the critical value, which is 5.8461, indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis.
Some of the empirical quantitative properties related to returns include a power-law behaviour, long
memory and correlation to volatility. We intend to demonstrate all these stylized facts with our model.
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Lux and Alfarano (2016) review a number of universal power laws characterizing financial markets. We
take into account two of these in our study. The first concerns the distribution of the returns which is
characterized by the presence of fat tails. It is found that fat-tailed distributed returns approximately
follow an inverse cubic power law described by
P
(
|rt − r¯
sd
| > X
)
∼ X−ζ (14)
where ζ ' 3 is the Pareto exponent (also called the characteristic exponent), r¯ and sd are the mean
and the standard deviation of the returns rt, and
rt − r¯
sd
is the normalized return. The pertinent liter-
ature converged on the insight of an exponent close to 3. Following He and Zheng (2016) and Gabaix
et al. (2006), we estimate the characteristic exponent with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimating the
logarithm of Eq.(14), that is
lnP (|rt − r¯
sd
| > X) = −ζlnX + b (15)
As shown in Table(2), for both the S&P500 and the SM the value of the characteristic exponent, ζ, is
close to 3, confirming the findings of empirical literature.
The second power law relates to the concept of volatility clustering. We can see how persistent the
volatility is by estimating the following power component in the ACFs of absolute returns (see Cont
(2001) and He and Zheng (2016))
corr(|rt|, |rt+q|) ' ζ
qd
(16)
where q is the number of lags, ζ is a parameter capturing the ACF of absolute returns with lag one, and
d is the power exponent capturing the decay of the ACFs. We estimated Eq.(16) with non-linear least
square and the results of each model are shown in Table(3). As we can see, our estimates are in line
with the empirical evidence which postulates a value of d in the interval [0.2 0.4]. Fig.11 (a) and (b)
plot the series of sample autocorrelation of the log-returns, absolute returns and squared returns of the
simulated data and of the S&P500. Both the stochastic and empirical series of returns are characterized
by no linear autocorrelation but high absolute and squared autocorrelations persistent up to more than 60
periods, in line with empirical regularity observed in financial time-series referred to as volatility clustering.
Finally, we complete the current analysis by testing the hypothesis of long-range dependence in the
volatility measured by the time-series of |rt|. To this end, we compute the Lo-modified range over
standard deviation or R/S statistic (also called re-scaled range) (see Lo (1991)). In Fig.11(c), we show
the R/S statistic for lags ranging from 1 to 100, and it is possible to see that we reject the null hypothesis
of no long-range dependence when the number is not particularly large, i.e. q ≤ 30. Indeed, for these
values of the lags, the Lo modified R/S statistic for S&P500 and SM all fall out of the 95% critical
interval [0.809 1.862] suggesting the presence of long memory in absolute return series.
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Table 2: Power law of returns. For each return series in S&P500 and SM, we estimate lnP (| rt−r¯sd | > X) =
−ζlnX + b with ordinary least squares and report ζ, the number of observation N and the R2.
S&P500 lnP (| rt−r¯sd | > X) SM lnP (| rt−r¯sd | > X)
ζ
2.9074∗∗∗ 2.7087∗∗∗
(0.2564) (0.1781)
N 46 46
R2 0.8533 0.9117
∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Table 3: Persistence of ACFs of absolute returns. For each return series in S&P500 and SM, we estimate
corr(|rt+q|, |rt| ' ζ/qd with nonlinear least squares and report ζ and d.
S&P500 corr(|rt+q|, |rt|) SM corr(|rt+q|, |rt|)
d
0.3692∗∗∗ 0.2218∗∗∗
(0.0615) (0.0163)
ζ 0.3360∗∗∗ 0.3219∗∗∗
N 150 150
R2 0.7359 0.8275
∗∗∗ significant at 1%.
Figure 11: Volatility clustering and long-range dependence. Panels (a) and (B) plots the ACFs of returns
(blue line), the absolute returns (red line) and the squared returns (yellow line) for S&P500 and SM
respectively. Panel (c) plots the Lo modified R/S statistic of the absolute returns.
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6 Conclusions
The aim of the paper is to model trading decisions of financial investors based on a sentiment index
introduced by Elyasiani et al. (2018). We consider two groups of fundamentalists with heterogeneous
beliefs about the fundamental value and we model an endogenous switching mechanism between the two
groups of traders, relying on the sentiment index. The sentiment index is considered as a benchmark
index for all agents. Depending on the value of the price, one group of agents is more aggressive than the
other in buying or selling. The main finding of our work is that the introduction of the sentiment index
allows the model to generate complex price dynamics. The model is able to distinguish a fear scenario,
a greed scenario, or a mixed fear and greed one. The difference in the two fundamental prices perceived,
thanks to the sentiment index, matters in all three scenarios.
In particular, when the proportion of the two groups of fundamentalists is similar, we observe sudden
changes from fear to greed scenarios and vice versa. Based on our analysis, a stability period is possible
when the proportion of one type of trader is very low. However, also in a stable period, the difference in
the two fundamental prices determines greater uncertainty in the fear compared to the greed scenario.
Moreover, we observe a higher uncertainty, proxied by the range of prices attained, in a fear than in a
greed scenario. As a result, our paper casts light on investor sentiment as one of the main drivers of
asymmetry in stock returns (Jawadi et al. (2018), Verma and Soydemir (2009)).
Finally, we note the transition to more complicated dynamics when the reactivity to price changes of
each group of traders increases.
The model is able to match many empirically observed stylized facts such as non-normality of the returns,
heavy tails and volatility clustering.
It is possible to extend our work in several ways. First, we could introduce chartists or other types of
noisy traders in order to model speculative agent behavior. Second, we could increase the heterogeneity
in trading decisions by assuming that each group of agents behaves according to a different sentiment
index.
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